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ABSTRACT 1 
After a person chooses between two items, preference for the chosen item will increase and 2 
preference for the unchosen item will decrease because of the choice made. In other words, 3 
we tend to justify or rationalize our past behavior by changing our attitude. This 4 
phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been traditionally explained by 5 
cognitive dissonance theory. Choosing something that is disliked or not choosing something 6 
that is liked are both cognitively inconsistent, and in order to reduce this inconsistency, 7 
people tend to change their subsequently stated preference in accordance with their past 8 
choices. Previously, neuroimaging studies identified posterior medial frontal cortex 9 
(pMFC) as a key brain region involved in cognitive dissonance. However, it still remains 10 
unknown whether the pMFC plays a causal role in inducing preference change following 11 
cognitive dissonance. Here, we demonstrate that 25-min 1-Hz repetitive transcranial 12 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied over the pMFC significantly reduces choice-induced 13 
preference change compared to sham stimulation, or control stimulation over a different 14 
brain region, demonstrating a causal role for the pMFC.15 
 4 
INTRODUCTION 1 
Contrary to a basic economic view that our behavior is driven by our preferences, 2 
psychological studies have demonstrated that past behaviors (e.g., making a choice) can 3 
also affect our preferences. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been 4 
traditionally demonstrated by the "free-choice paradigm" (e.g., Brehm, 1956) in which 5 
individuals are first asked to rate several items for their preference, and then make choices 6 
between pairs of equally attractive items (e.g., posters, CDs, etc.) so that they inevitably 7 
have to reject items they may like. When asked to rate the same items a second time they 8 
typically report increased preference for the items they chose and decreased preference for 9 
the items they rejected. This phenomenon is usually explained as an effect of cognitive 10 
dissonance. According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), any inconsistency 11 
between beliefs, preferences, or choices (e.g. not choosing a preferred item) results in an 12 
aversive feeling (cognitive dissonance), that in turn motivates people to reconcile the 13 
inconsistency (e.g., to justify their past behavior by changing their preference).  14 
 More recently, social cognitive neuroscientists have started to investigate the neural 15 
mechanisms underlying cognitive dissonance and subsequent preference change, and found 16 
that a posterior part of medial frontal cortex (pMFC) activates when individuals detect 17 
inconsistency between their attitude and behavior (e.g., van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 18 
2010). However, these neuroimaging results still left it unknown whether the pMFC 19 
activity merely reflects an epiphenomenon of cognitive dissonance such as passive 20 
emotional reactions to inconsistency, or whether it plays a more active role in inducing 21 
preference change to resolve inconsistency. 22 
In the present study, we attempted to answer this question of causality by using 1-Hz 23 
25-min repetitive TMS (rTMS) to temporarily downregulate neuronal activity within pMFC 24 
to test whether this reduces the cognitive dissonance effect. In order to measure 25 
choice-induced preference change, we employed a modified free-choice paradigm using a 26 
"choice-blindness" procedure (Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013); 27 
see Methods for details). This procedure controls for an important artifact inherent in the 28 
 5 
original free-choice paradigm (Chen and Risen, 2010; for a review, Izuma and Murayama, 1 
2013), thus allowing for a methodologically rigorous test of the hypothesis. 2 
3 
 6 
MATERIALS and METHODS 1 
 2 
Participants 3 
A total of 61 individuals participated in the study. One participant decided to withdraw 4 
from the study after the TMS procedure was explained. Another participant was also 5 
withdrawn from the study because the participant reported feeling dizzy during the motor 6 
thresholding procedure (see below for more details). Seven additional participants were 7 
also excluded from the analyses: four detected our critical switch manipulation during the 8 
Choice task (see below for details); two were excluded due to technical problems with TMS, 9 
and one other participant showed a significantly negative correlation between two 10 
preference ratings (First and Second Rating tasks described below; r(49) = -0.23, which is 11 
more than 3 SDs below the group average of r = 0.48 [SD = 0.21]), suggesting very poor 12 
compliance with the task instructions. Accordingly, the final analyses were based on 52 13 
participants. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three TMS groups 14 
(between-subject design); 1) pMFC group (n = 17, 8 female, mean age = 22.4), 2) 15 
sham-pMFC group (n = 17, 7 female, mean age =22.5), or 3) posterior parietal cortex 16 
(PPC) group (n = 18, 8 female, mean age = 21.6). There was no significant difference in 17 
age across the three TMS groups (p = 0.84). The participants were all right-handed with no 18 
history of neurological or psychiatric illness. All participants gave written informed consent 19 
for participation, and the study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 20 
California Institute of Technology. 21 
 22 
Stimuli 23 
The experimental stimuli chosen for this experiment were abstract computer desktop 24 
images freely available on the Internet (see Figure 1). There were 50 images used in the 25 
study, paired up in 25 pairs of similar but distinct images (the pairs were fixed among all 26 
participants). This was done to allow the switch manipulation used in the Choice Task to be 27 
undetected by participants, but still provide stimuli that could be differentially preferred. 28 
 7 
 1 
Experimental tasks 2 
In the present study, we used a modified free-choice paradigm using a 3 
"choice-blindness" procedure (Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013) 4 
during the choice task. The procedure (detailed below) allowed us to address an important 5 
methodological flaw in the original paradigm (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma and 6 
Murayama, 2013). Ratings are not perfect measures of true preference (i.e. there is some 7 
“noise” in ratings). During the choice task of the paradigm, an individual’s choice reveals 8 
additional information about their true preference. Because items chosen are more likely to 9 
have higher true preferences than rejected items, when measured a second time, chosen 10 
items are more likely to be rated higher than rejected items (i.e., regression toward true 11 
preference). Because the effects of true preference and choice are confounded in such a 12 
manner, the original “free-choice” paradigm could inadvertently measure preference 13 
change without the effect of choice on true preference. To deal with this methodological 14 
issue, we employed a modified choice task in our experimental paradigm in which 15 
individuals were occasionally led to believe that they had chosen the item they actually 16 
preferred less than the alternative. Thus, although preference and choice often go together, 17 
our paradigm allows us to dissociate one from the another, which made it possible to 18 
dissociate the effects of choice from the effect of true preference. Before the current TMS 19 
study, we ran a behavioral pilot study (without TMS; n = 26) to verify that we can measure 20 
choice-induced preference change over and above the confound (data not shown). We also 21 
verified that the detection rate of our critical switch manipulation (see below) was 22 
sufficiently low (3 out of 26 participants). 23 
In the present study, participants performed the four following tasks in fixed order; 1) 24 
First Rating task, 2) Choice task, 3) Second Rating task, and 4) Memory task. Because our 25 
prior fMRI study demonstrated pMFC activation in response to the discrepancy between 26 
behavior and attitude during the Second Rating task (Izuma et al., 2010), the rTMS 27 
treatment was administered right before participants performed the Second Rating tasks (an 28 
off-line rTMS approach). After completing the Second Rating task, all the participants took 29 
 8 
a 35-40 min break before the Memory task, to ensure that the effects of TMS had subsided 1 
before continuing. 2 
In the First Rating Task, participants were presented with images serially and were 3 
instructed to rate how much they liked each image by using an 8-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 
8 = very much) labeled on the keyboard. There was no time limit, but participants were 5 
encouraged to give their first impression. The inter-trial interval was 1 second. 6 
In the Choice task, images were presented in pairs, and participants were asked to 7 
indicate the image they preferred in each trial by using a computer mouse with their right 8 
hand. Thus, participants made 25 binary choices in total (50 images). There were 4 9 
experimental conditions during the Choice task; 1) Switch trials (5 trials), 2) No-switch 10 
trials (5 trials), 3) Computer trials (5 trials), and 4) Other trials (10 trials; not included in 11 
preference change analysis). 12 
While the 25 pairs were fixed among all participants, which pairs were used in each of 13 
the four conditions (Swtich, No-Swtich, Computer and Other) in the Choice task was 14 
determined based on each participant's rating during the First Rating task. Before the 15 
Choice task, 15 image-pairs (30 images) used in the Switch, No-Switch and Computer trials 16 
were automatically matched by a Matlab program in terms of the difference in the first 17 
ratings between two images in each pair. As discussed previously (Chen and Risen, 2010; 18 
Izuma and Murayama, 2013), the strength of the artifact in the traditional free choice 19 
paradigm depends on the rating difference between two images in a choice pair (i.e., the 20 
smaller the within-pair rating difference, the bigger the preference change by the artifact). 21 
Moreover, pairs with larger difference in the first ratings were preferentially allocated to the 22 
three conditions used in analysis. This was done to induce stronger cognitive dissonance 23 
(i.e., larger discrepancy between preference and choice) in the Switch condition. That is, 24 
assuming that participants choose the image from a pair with the higher first rating most of 25 
the time, when their choice is reversed by the switch manipulation, they would believe that 26 
they chose the image they disliked and did not choose the image they liked. The remaining 27 
20 images were assigned to the Other condition and excluded from preference change 28 
analysis because items in the Other trials were not matched on within-pair rating difference. 29 
 9 
Thus the comparisons between the Other vs. the three critical conditions would not be 1 
informative. Although not used in the analyses, these additional 20 images were necessary 2 
in order to have more options from which we chose 15 pairs for the three critical conditions 3 
that were sufficiently matched on the within-pair difference.  4 
In each trial of the Switch condition, participants were first asked to click the "Start" 5 
button located on the left side of the screen (Figure 1a, stage 1). As soon as they clicked the 6 
button, two images and two boxes (a yellow box on the top and a blue box on the bottom, 7 
both of which were aligned with each of two images) appeared on the screen (Figure 1a, 8 
stage 2). Participants were asked to look at each of the two images carefully and to move 9 
the mouse cursor to the box corresponding to the image they preferred. For example, if they 10 
preferred the image on the top, they moved the cursor to the yellow box. The two images 11 
remained on the screen until a preference was indicated, or for a maximum of 3 seconds. If 12 
the participants did not decide after 3 seconds, the two images disappeared, and participants 13 
then had to make their choice from memory.  14 
As soon as the cursor touched one of the two boxes, the screen automatically changed, 15 
and participants performed 4 trials of a flanker task (Figure 1a, stage 3), which was 16 
intended to distract participants' memory for the locations of the two images. During 17 
instructions, the Choice task was referred to as the "choice and attention" task, and each 18 
participant was told that the task was intended to test decision-making and attention at the 19 
same time, providing an explanation for the flanker task. During the four trials of the 20 
flanker task, there were always 2 congruent (">>>>>" or "<<<<<") and 2 incongruent 21 
("<<><<" or ">><>>") trials, and participants were asked to answer the direction of a 22 
central target arrow (left or right). Participants responded by pressing one of two keys 23 
labeled on the keyboard with their left hand (index and middle fingers), and were told that 24 
they would get one point every time they responded accurately within 1 second. They were 25 
encouraged to try to get at least 60 points (out of 100) in total and aim for 80 points if 26 
possible. There was no monetary incentive for the task. Stimuli were presented once every 27 
second (0.5 seconds for stimulus presentation plus 0.5 seconds for inter-stimulus interval). 28 
 10 
After 4 trials (4 sec), the total points accumulated were displayed on the screen for 1 1 
second. 2 
 3 
 4 
Figure 1: The illustration of a Switch trial (a), a No-switch trial (b) and a Computer trial (c) during the 5 
Choice task. During Switch and No-switch trials, participants were first instructed to move the mouse cursor 6 
to the box corresponding to the image they preferred (e.g., a yellow box if they preferred the image on the 7 
top). After performing 4 trials of the Flanker task that serves as a distractor (stage 3), they were asked to click 8 
the image on the screen (stage 4; presumably the one they preferred at stage 2). Note that the locations of two 9 
images were switched between stages 2 and 4 only during a Switch trial so that the participants were led to 10 
believe that they had chosen the image they actually preferred less than the alternative. Each image of Switch 11 
and No-switch trials was categorized into one of the 4 conditions (images A-D) depending on the condition 12 
(Switch or No-switch) and participant's action during stage 2 (preferred or unpreferred). During a computer 13 
trial, participants were asked to simply pick the image selected by a computer (indicated by red arrows). Each 14 
image of Computer trials was categorized into either Computer-chosen or Computer unchosen conditions 15 
(images E & F). 16 
 17 
After the flanker task (5 seconds in total), the screen showed only one image, which 18 
was presumably the one they had preferred before the flanker task, along with the start 19 
button and the box touched by the participants (Figure 1a, stage 4). Finally, participants 20 
were instructed to click the image on the screen (presumably the one they had preferred), 21 
 11 
and the image was highlighted by a light blue square for 1.5 seconds. Unknown to the 1 
participants, during the Switch trials, the locations of two images were switched after the 2 
flanker task so that they were led to believe that they had chosen the image they actually 3 
preferred less than the alternative (i.e., the image that was not preferred at the stage 2 of the 4 
Choice task) The switch manipulation always occurred on 5th, 10th, 16th, 20th, and 24th 5 
trials. No participant reported the switches during the task, but 4 of them reported it during 6 
the post-experimental interview (see below).  7 
In the No-switch trials (and Other trials), the task proceeded in the same way except 8 
that no switch was made (Figure 1b, stage 4). In the Computer trials, the words 9 
"Computer's choice" were displayed above the start button at the beginning of the trial 10 
(Figure 1c, stage 1). After clicking the start button, two images and two boxes were 11 
displayed on the screen just like other trials. However, the participants were asked to wait 12 
for a computer to choose one of two images. After 1 second, the computer's choice (red 13 
arrows) was displayed on the screen (see Figure 1c, stage 2), and the participants were 14 
asked to simply move the cursor to the box (thus the wallpaper) selected by a computer. 15 
The rest of the task proceeded in the same way as No-switch and Other trials, and no switch 16 
manipulation was introduced during the Computer trials.  17 
Importantly, unknown to the participants, each computer trial occurred shortly after 18 
each of the Switch trials (specifically, the Computer trials always occurred on 6th, 12th, 19 
17th, 22nd, and 25th trials), and by doing so, the Computer's choice automatically 20 
mimicked the participant's choice made in a previous Switch trial in terms of consistency 21 
between their first preference rating and choice (note that more specifically, "choice" here 22 
refers to participant's preference revealed at the stage 2 of the Choice task). That is, suppose 23 
a participant was presented with two images that were rated 5 and 7 on the 8-point scale 24 
during the First Preference Rating task. Typically, they prefer the image with a higher first 25 
rating (i.e., the one rated 7) during the stage 2 of the Choice task. However, since behavior 26 
is noisy, occasionally they would prefer the image with a lower rating (i.e., the one rated 5) 27 
during the stage 2 of the Choice task. Because this behavior is known to contribute to an 28 
important artifact (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma and Murayama, 2013), the computer trials 29 
 12 
were programmed to select the image with a lower first rating whenever the participant 1 
preferred (i.e., based on their action in the stage 2 of Figure 1) the image with a lower first 2 
rating in a previous Switch trial. Similarly, the computer selected the image with a higher 3 
first rating when the participant preferred the image with a higher first rating in a previous 4 
Switch trial. The order of No-switch and Other trials was randomly determined. 5 
At the end of the Choice task, each of the 30 images used in the Switch, No-switch and 6 
Computer trials was categorized into the 6 conditions (5 images each) depicted in Figure 1 7 
(images A-F). Based on participant’s action during the stage 2 of the Switch and No-switch 8 
trials, each image was categorized as either "preferred" or "unpreferred." Similarly, based 9 
on participant’s final choice during the stage 4, each image was categorized as either 10 
"chosen" or "unchosen." Because of the switch manipulation, preference and choice are 11 
inconsistent in the Switch condition (e.g., preferred-unchosen or unpreferred-chosen). Thus, 12 
the choice-blindness paradigm makes it possible to dissociate the effect of choice from the 13 
effect of preference. 14 
After the completion of the Choice task, the participants were escorted to the TMS 15 
room where rTMS was administered as described below. Immediately after rTMS, the 16 
participants were asked to perform the Second Rating task in the TMS room. All 17 
participants started the task within 2 min of the TMS completion. 18 
The Second Rating task was similar to the first one, with the exception that the images 19 
were now accompanied with information from the choices the participants had previously 20 
made (as similarly done in the previous fMRI study; (Izuma et al., 2010). Below each 21 
image, they were presented with the information about whether they (or a computer) had 22 
chosen or unchosen the image during the Choice task (e.g., "You chose this picture," 23 
"Computer rejected this picture," etc.). For items in the Switch condition, this information 24 
was based on what participants believed to have chosen at the stage 4 of the Choice task 25 
(Figure 1). More specifically, those images clicked on after the Flanker task in the stage 4 26 
were accompanied with "You chose this picture," whereas alternative images were 27 
accompanied with "You rejected this picture." This information was intended to make the 28 
effect of cognitive dissonance stronger by making the discrepancy between attitude and 29 
 13 
past behavior salient. It should be noted that because of the explicit information, preference 1 
change found in the present study should if anything be inflated. However, the aim of the 2 
present study is not to find a minimum condition for choice-induced preference change to 3 
occur, but to test the effect of TMS on pMFC when it does occur (see the paper by (Salti et 4 
al., 2014) that formally tests the effect of this explicit information). The participants were 5 
told that this information about their past choices was related to a task they were going to 6 
perform afterwards, but not related to the rating task, and they were asked to focus on 7 
reporting their preference for each image one more time. As was in the First Rating task, 8 
they rated the same 50 images using the 8-point scale. 9 
After the Second Rating task, the participants were also asked to answer the Positive 10 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) questionnaire (10 items each for positive and 11 
negative moods) (Watson et al., 1988) by using an 8-point scale to measure if different 12 
rTMS conditions had differential effect on their mood. All the participants finished the 13 
Second Rating task and the PANAS questionnaire within 8 min after the TMS, thus 14 
presumably well under the influence of the 25-min rTMS (e.g., see Bruckner et al., 2013). 15 
After completing the questionnaire, they took a 35-40 min break in the original 16 
experimental room to ensure the effects of the TMS had subsided before continuing. 17 
After the break, the participants completed the Memory task. Importantly, the Memory 18 
task was completely unanticipated by the participants, and they did not know that memory 19 
about their past choices would be tested later on. During the task, they were presented 20 
images serially (as in the first and second rating tasks) and were instructed to answer 21 
whether they “chose” or “rejected” (i.e., unchosen) the item during the Choice task by 22 
pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. They were instructed that images presented in 23 
the Computer trials of the Choice task would not be presented. Consequently, a total of 40 24 
images were presented during the task. They were also asked to make best guess if they 25 
were not certain.  26 
The Memory task was intended to test whether the rTMS had any differential effect on 27 
the participants’ ability to retrieve memory about their past choices. Although during the 28 
Second Rating task, the participants' past choice for each presented image was explicitly 29 
 14 
displayed, if the participants were able to remember their (correct) indicated preferences in 1 
the Switch trials, then the intended effect of cognitive dissonance induced by discrepancy 2 
between behavior and attitude would have been likely to be reduced. It should be noted that 3 
during the Memory task, the correct response was defined based on participants' action at 4 
the stage 2 of the Choice task. Accordingly, if the switch manipulation was successful, and 5 
participants believed the explicit information about their past choice during the Second 6 
Rating task, memory performance for the Switch condition should be lower than that for 7 
the Non-switch condition (e.g., they mistakenly remember that they chose the item which 8 
they actually did not prefer at the stage 2 due to the switch manipulation). 9 
After finishing the Memory task, participants were asked to complete the Preference for 10 
Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995) using an 8-point scale. This 18-item scale was 11 
intended to measure individuals' disposition to perceive themselves as predictable, stable 12 
and thus consistent (e.g., "It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my 13 
beliefs"). 14 
Finally, as similarly done in the original choice-blindness study (Johansson et al., 2008), 15 
the participants were asked the three following questions during the post-experimental 16 
interview to ensure that they did not detect our critical switch manipulation; "Do you have 17 
any comments on the experiment?", "Do you find anything strange with the wallpaper 18 
stimuli during the tasks?", "Some participants mentioned that during some trials of the 19 
Choice task, the locations of two images changed. Do you think it happened to you?" The 20 
three questions were asked always in this order of increasing specificity. Four participants 21 
reported in response to the last question that the switch happened to them also, and thus 22 
they were excluded from the analyses. All the remaining participants showed no sign of 23 
detection. 24 
 25 
TMS procedures 26 
In order to downregulate the activity in pMFC, we employed 1-Hz repetitive TMS 27 
(rTMS). rTMS is a non-invasive technique that can produce after-effects on cortical 28 
 15 
excitability, and a low frequency (e.g., 1-Hz) rTMS is known to decrease cortical 1 
excitability in stimulated areas (Ridding and Rothwell, 2007). Each participant received 2 
1-Hz rTMS for 25 minutes. According to previous reports (e.g. Bruckner et al., 2013), the 3 
after effect of the 25-min 1-Hz rTMS is considered to last 20 min or more. A Magstim 4 
Super Rapid with a 70mm air-cooled figure-8 coil was used. 5 
The experimenter administering TMS was blind to the task and study design except for 6 
knowledge of the three stimulation conditions, and was in the same room as the participants 7 
only during the TMS phase and an initial portion of the Second Rating task. The 8 
experimenter administering the participants’ tasks was absent during TMS positioning and 9 
delivery, and not informed of the TMS condition until after the completion of the 10 
experiment. Participants were blind to the study’s intent, but were aware of the possibility 11 
that they could be receiving either real or sham stimulation, and that real stimulation would 12 
be expected to lower the level of brain activity in the area under the coil for up to 30 13 
minutes after the end of stimulation. 14 
The intensity of the TMS was set for each participant at 80% of the participant’s active 15 
motor threshold. To determine threshold, we first adjusted the TMS coil location and 16 
orientation to maximize the EMG magnitude in tibialis anterior from single pulse 17 
stimulation. The participant was then asked to steadily contract the muscle with moderate 18 
intensity. Starting from 50% output, the stimulator was adjusted in 5% steps to find the 19 
minimum intensity at which single-pulse TMS elicited a liminal EMG for 3 out of 4 stimuli. 20 
The main rTMS treatment was conducted at 80% of this value. 21 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three TMS groups; 1) pMFC, 2) 22 
sham-pMFC, and 3) PPC. Based on previous fMRI studies (Izuma et al., 2010; Izuma and 23 
Adolphs, 2013), the pMFC target region was determined as one-third of the distance from 24 
nasion to inion (i.e., the region roughly corresponding to the areas commonly activated in 25 
our two previous fMRI studies) and the control (PPC) region was determined as two-thirds 26 
of the same distance (Harmer et al., 2001) (see Figure 2). Because activations found in the 27 
previous fMRI studies were slightly stronger in the right hemisphere (Izuma et al., 2010; 28 
 16 
Izuma and Adolphs, 2013), both stimulation sites were offset to the right of the 1 
nasion-Cz-inion midline by 1 cm. The TMS coil was positioned with handle pointing in the 2 
superior direction. During the 25-min rTMS, participants in the pMFC and sham-pMFC 3 
group were supine, while those in the PPC group were prone. Sham-TMS was administered 4 
by tilting the coil 90 degrees off the scalp so that no stimulation actually reached the cortex. 5 
 6 
Figure 2: The location of rTMS target sites. The pMFC target region was determined as one-third of the 7 
distance from nasion to inion, and the PPC region was determined as two-thirds of the same distance. Our two 8 
simulated regions roughly correspond to the MNI coordinates of x = 10, y = 48, z = 70 (pMFC) and x = 10, y 9 
= -76, z = 85. 10 
 11 
Coil orientation: TMS effects are maximized when the induced field is perpendicular to 12 
the gyral pattern, as this aligns the field with cortical columns in the walls of the sulcus 13 
(Brasil-Neto et al., 1992; Mills et al., 1992; Fox et al., 2004). Based on the gyral pattern in 14 
the area of interest, we chose to orient the field parallel to the midline. Stimulation polarity 15 
with respect to this line can modulate the effectiveness of stimulation, but there is no 16 
preceding research that would indicate the optimal polarity for this area or function. Also, 17 
the stimulator is biphasic, which makes polarity less critical (Brasil-Neto et al., 1992). Thus, 18 
we positioned the handle in the superior direction to minimize the equipment's 19 
obtrusiveness to the participant. It is possible that the opposite orientation of the coil would 20 
have induced a stronger effect.  21 
 17 
Adverse Effects: TMS was well-tolerated by most participants, who generally fell 1 
asleep during the main treatment. One participant, however, experienced dizziness after 2 
receiving 3 sham and 5 real single-pulse stimuli during the search for the site for 3 
stimulating tibialis anterior. Dizziness declined, resolving after approximately 2 minutes. 4 
The participant was examined by emergency medical technicians and released. Dizziness 5 
was attributed to a combination of stress/anxiety of the experiment, and pre-existing 6 
conditions of sleep deprivation and dehydration. 7 
 8 
Data analyses 9 
Our main analysis is based on the 2 (Preference; preferred or unpreferred) X 2 (Switch; 10 
switch or no switch) X 3 (TMS group; pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed design with 11 
preference change (second preference ratings minus first preference ratings) as a dependent 12 
variable. It should be noted that in our choice-blindness paradigm, a choice-induced 13 
preference change is indicated by a significant 2 (Preference; preferred or unpreferred) X 2 14 
(Switch; switch or no switch) interaction. This 2 X 2 interaction indicates that preference 15 
change depends on what the participants believed about past choices they had made 16 
previously. Regardless of their initial relative preferences of two images as revealed in the 17 
stage 2 of the Choice task (Figure 1) (preferred or unpreferred), preferences for the images 18 
should increase when participants believed that they had chosen the image (i.e., the 19 
preferred-No-switch condition and the unpreferred-Switch condition), while preferences for 20 
images should decrease when images were thought to have been unchosen (i.e., the 21 
preferred-Switch condition and the unpreferred-No-switch condition). 22 
Furthermore, in order to 1) compute the size of the TMS effect on choice-induced 23 
preference change and 2) investigate the correlation between individual difference in 24 
choice-induced preference change and participant's tendency to prefer consistency as 25 
measured by the Preference for Consistency scale, we computed a single preference change 26 
score for each participant as following: We computed the 2-way (Preference X Switch) 27 
interaction term, divided it by 2 in order to take an average of preference change observed in 28 
 18 
the Preferred and Unpreferred conditions, and subtracted preference change observed in the 1 
computer condition. This score represents the magnitude of preference change caused by 2 
choices participants themselves made. More specifically, a preference change (PC) score was 3 
computed as 4 
 5 
[(PCPreferred-No_switch - PCPreferred-Switch) + (PCUnpreferred-Switch - PCUnpreferred-No_Switch)]/2 - 6 
(PCComputer_Chosen - PCComputer_unchosen) 7 
8 
 19 
RESULTS 1 
Preference Change 2 
A 2 (Preference; preferred or unpreferred) X 2 (Switch; switch or no switch) X 3 (TMS 3 
group; pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way 4 
Preference X Switch interaction (F(1,49) = 23.19, p < 0.001). Importantly, it also revealed a 5 
critical 3-way Preference X Switch X TMS group interaction (F(2,49) = 3.34, p = 0.044) 6 
(Figure 3). No other significant main effect or interaction was found in the ANOVA (all ps 7 
> 0.082). 8 
 9 
 10 
Figure 3: Mean preference changes (2nd preference ratings minus 1st preference ratings) in the Switch and 11 
No-switch conditions across the three TMS groups. Note that "Preferred" and "Unpreferred" (x-axis) are 12 
based on participant's relative preferences of paired images, which was revealed during the Stage 2 of the 13 
Choice task (Figure 1). 14 
 15 
In order to further probe the significant 3-way interaction, 3 separate two-way 16 
(Preference X Choice) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for each TMS group. 17 
This revealed a significant Preference X Choice interaction in the sham-pMFC group (F(1,16) 18 
= 16.36, p < 0.001; Figure 3b) and in the PPC group (F(1,17) = 7.73, p = 0.013; Figure 3c). 19 
As stated earlier, this 2-way interaction indicates the existence of choice-induced 20 
preference change and indicates that preference change depends on what the participants 21 
believed about past choices they had made previously regardless of their initial relative 22 
 20 
preferences of two images (preferred or unpreferred). We further conducted two-sample 1 
t-tests comparing switch vs. no-switch conditions in each of the preferred and unpreferred 2 
conditions for the sham-pMFC and PPC groups. The results revealed that the difference 3 
between the switch vs. no-switch conditions were all significant (p < 0.006) except for the 4 
unpreferred condition of the PPC group (p = 0.21). In contrast, the same 2-way interaction 5 
was not significant for the pMFC group (F(1,16) = 1.30, p = 0.27, n.s.) (Figure 3a). 6 
Two-sample t-tests comparing switch vs. no-switch conditions in each of the preferred and 7 
unpreferred conditions for the pMFC group revealed that there was no significant 8 
difference in both preferred and unpreferred conditions (p > 0.45). Thus, rTMS to the 9 
pMFC region significantly reduced choice-induced preference change. 10 
In order to test whether TMS had any effect on preference change for the items 11 
presented in the Computer condition, we conducted 2 (Computer's choice; chosen or 12 
unchosen) X 3 (TMS group) mixed ANOVA. It revealed a significant main effect of 13 
Computer's choice (F(1,49) = 7.65, p = 0.008). However, a main effect of TMS group and a 14 
2-way interaction were not significant (ps > 0.18), indicating that TMS had no influence on 15 
preference change following choices made by the computer. As seen in Figure 4, across all 16 
three TMS groups, participants' preference for the items chosen by computer decreased, 17 
while their preference for the items unchosen by computer increased. This result seems to 18 
suggest the existence of a significant regression-to-the-mean effect. Since the computer's 19 
choice was matched with participant's choice made in the Switch condition, the items 20 
chosen by the computer were more likely to have higher first preference ratings. 21 
Accordingly, participant's preference rating for the items chosen by the computer is more 22 
likely to decrease during the second rating task due to the regression-to-the-mean effect 23 
compared to the items unchosen by computer.  24 
 21 
 1 
Figure 4: Mean preference changes (2nd preference ratings minus 1st preference ratings) in the Computer 2 
condition across the three TMS groups. 3 
 4 
Effect Size Analysis 5 
In order to compute the size of the TMS effect on choice-induced preference change, we 6 
computed a single preference change score as described in Method. One-way ANOVA on 7 
this score comparing across the three TMS groups revealed a marginally significant effect of 8 
TMS (F(2, 49) = 2.56, p = 0.088). Because there was no significant difference in mean 9 
preference change scores between two control conditions (the sham-pMFC and PPC groups, 10 
p = 0.28), we combined these two control groups in order to calculate Cohen's d. A 11 
two-sample t-test comparing the pMFC group with this combined control group revealed a 12 
significant difference (t(50) = 1.93, p = 0.03), and the calculation of Cohen's d revealed a 13 
moderate effect size of the TMS (d = 0.59). 14 
 15 
Control Analyses 16 
We tested whether the rTMS had any effect on 1) participants' general attention level as 17 
indexed by reaction times (RTs) during the First and Second Rating tasks, 2) mood as 18 
measured by PANAS, and 3) memory about past choices. 19 
A 2 (Rating task; first or second) X 3 (TMS group) mixed ANOVA on RTs revealed no 20 
significant main effects or interaction (ps > 0.15), suggesting that the rTMS did not affect 21 
participants' attention level during the Second Rating task, which they performed 22 
 22 
immediately after the rTMS. Regardless of the TMS groups, average RT (including all 50 1 
trials) during the First Rating task was 2.17 sec (SD = 0.80), while average RT during the 2 
Second Rating task was 2.07 sec (SD = 0.70). 3 
Two 1 X 3 (TMS group) ANOVAs on positive and negative mood of the PANAS score 4 
revealed no significant effect of the rTMS (ps > 0.34), indicating that the rTMS did not 5 
alter participants' mood. 6 
A 2 (Switch; switch or no-switch) X 3 (TMS group) mixed ANOVA on memory about 7 
past choices revealed a significant main effect of the switch manipulation (F(1,49) = 4.14, p = 8 
0.047). Because, in the Switch condition, the participants were led to believe that they 9 
chose the image they preferred less than the alternatives, their memory performances were 10 
significantly lower than those in the No-switch condition. Regardless of the TMS group, 11 
average memory performance of the Non-switch condition was 58.5 % (SD = 13.6), which 12 
was significantly higher than the chance level (50 %; t(51) = 4.48, p < 0.001), whereas 13 
average memory performance of the Switch condition was 47.9 % (SD = 16.4), which did 14 
not differ significantly from the chance level (p = 0.36). This result suggests that our switch 15 
manipulation was successful, and participants continued to believe that they had chosen the 16 
images they actually preferred less than alternatives and had not chosen the images they 17 
preferred more than alternatives. A main effect of the TMS group and a 2-way interaction 18 
were not significant (ps > 0.77), suggesting that our main results reported above cannot be 19 
explained by differential memory about past choices across the three TMS groups. 20 
Finally, we also checked whether 1) within-pair rating difference and 2) the 21 
preference-choice consistency were successfully matched across the three experimental 22 
conditions (Switch, No-switch and Computer) during the Choice task as we intended. 23 
First, average within-pair rating differences (all TMS group combined, n = 52) in the 24 
No-Switch and Switch conditions were both 1.98, and it was 2.01 in the Computer 25 
condition. A 3 (experimental conditions; Switch, No-switch, or Computer) X 3 (TMS 26 
group; pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 27 
interaction (ps > 0.19). 28 
 23 
Second, participants generally chose images that had higher first preference rating when 1 
they had a chance to make a choice themselves (i.e., the Switch and No-switch conditions). 2 
The mean preference-choice consistency (all TMS group combined, n = 52) in the 3 
No-switch condition was 62.9%, and it was 65.0% in the Switch condition and the 4 
Computer condition (as previously described, the preference-choice consistency was 5 
matched between these two conditions by the task program). A 3 (experimental conditions; 6 
Switch, No-switch, or Computer) X 3 (TMS group; pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed 7 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect or interaction (ps > 0.66).  8 
Taken together, these results indicate that the main findings reported above is highly 9 
unlikely to be explained by the different level of the artifact (Chen and Risen, 2010) across 10 
three TMS groups. 11 
 12 
Preference for Consistency Scale 13 
Finally, we conducted 1 X 3 (TMS group) between-participant ANOVA on the 14 
preference for consistency scale. It revealed no significant effect (p = 0.54), suggesting that 15 
individual difference in the tendency to prefer consistency was no different across the three 16 
TMS groups. 17 
We also investigated, as exploratory analyses, whether participants' preference for 18 
consistency scores were related to their level of choice-induced preference change, 19 
separately for each TMS group. We used the same single preference change score described 20 
above to index an individual's tendency to justify choices they made. Although correlations 21 
in all 3 groups did not reach statistical significance largely due to our limited sample size, 22 
sham-pMFC and PPC groups tended to show positive correlation (sham-pMFC r(15) = 0.27, 23 
p = 0.15; PPC r(16) = 0.32, p = 0.10). In contrast, correlation in the pMFC group was 24 
virtually zero (r(15) = 0.03, p = 0.46). 25 
 26 
27 
 24 
DISCUSSION 1 
The present study demonstrated that choice-induced preference change was 2 
significantly reduced by TMS over the pMFC region compared to the control conditions 3 
(TMS to the PPC region and sham-TMS to the pMFC region), providing the evidence that 4 
the pMFC plays a causal role in inducing preference change following inconsistency 5 
between choice and preference. It is important to note that we used a modified 6 
choice-blindness paradigm to control for the artifact inherent in the traditional free-choice 7 
paradigm (Chen and Risen, 2010). Thus, unlike a number of previous behavioral as well as 8 
neuroimaging studies that used the original paradigm (see Izuma and Murayama, 2013), the 9 
present study provides unequivocal evidence for the existence of choice-induced preference 10 
change and the effect of TMS over different brain regions on the phenomenon. 11 
The present findings are consistent with the previous studies showing that the pMFC 12 
plays a causal role in inducing behavioral or attitude change following a variety of aversive 13 
experiences in both social and non-social contexts. The pMFC is known to be activated by 14 
a variety of aversive outcomes (Shackman et al., 2011). Furthermore, some neurons in 15 
pMFC do not simply respond to negative outcomes per se, rather these neurons respond to 16 
negative outcome (e.g., reduced reward) only when the monkey subsequently changed their 17 
behavior from the previous trial (Shima and Tanji, 1998). There exist similar neurons in the 18 
human dorsal anterior cingulate regions, and ablation of this area significantly impaired 19 
participants' performance in a reward-based movement selection task especially when they 20 
had to change their movement after reduced reward (Williams et al., 2004). Recently, fMRI 21 
studies found that the same region is activated by aversive experiences in social contexts 22 
(for a review, Izuma, 2013), such as disagreeing with others (Klucharev et al., 2009; Izuma 23 
and Adolphs, 2013), or agreeing with people we dislike (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). 24 
Furthermore, Klucharev and his colleagues demonstrated that TMS to the pMFC region 25 
significantly decreased individual's tendency to conform to others' opinion (Klucharev et al., 26 
2011). Therefore, just like its known role for non-social situations (Williams et al., 2004), 27 
the pMFC plays a key role not only in detecting a social situation that requires some level 28 
 25 
of adjustment in behavior or attitude (such as cognitive dissonance, disagreeing with others, 1 
etc.), but also in actually inducing that change.  2 
It is important to note that preference change following cognitive dissonance requires at 3 
least two processes: 1) detection of discrepancy (conflict), and 2) subsequent 4 
implementation of conflict resolution. The present study does not allow us to specify the 5 
exact role played by pMFC. The pMFC could play a role in either conflict detection, 6 
conflict resolution or both. Two past TMS studies on response-level conflict showed that 7 
pre-SMA plays a causal role in conflict resolution rather than conflict detection (Mars et al., 8 
2009; Soutschek et al., 2013), and it will be an important future direction to investigate 9 
whether the pMFC plays a similar causal role in resolving (rather than simply detecting) 10 
cognitive conflict such as cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, two past studies 11 
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2008b; Mengarelli et al., 2013) suggested that left dorsolateral 12 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) plays a causal role in the resolution of cognitive dissonance, part 13 
of a larger literature from neuroimaging studies that have found correlational evidence for 14 
this brain region’s role in cognitive dissonance processes (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008a; 15 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2008b; van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010). It was further 16 
demonstrated that the DLPFC specifically in left hemisphere plays a causal role in 17 
choice-induced preference change (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008b; Mengarelli et al., 2013). 18 
An electroencephalography (EEG) study found that when an individual's left dorsal 19 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity was decreased through neurofeedback training, 20 
choice-induced preference change was significantly reduced (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008b). 21 
Conceptually similar results have been reported by a study using transcranial direct current 22 
stimulation (tDCS) (Mengarelli et al., 2013). It showed that choice-induced preference 23 
change was significantly reduced after individual's left DLPFC was stimulated by cathodal 24 
tDCS, which is known to reduce the excitability of the target areas. However, another EEG 25 
study (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011) suggests that the DLPFC is not related to cognitive 26 
dissonance per se, and the commitment to the chosen course of actions can increase the left 27 
DLPFC activity regardless of the existence of inconsistency between attitude and actions. 28 
As the DLPFC is known to be involved in cognitive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001), the 29 
 26 
studies seem to suggest that the actual implementation of choice justification requires 1 
general cognitive control processes.  2 
Although this neural model of a discrepancy (dissonance) resolution system is similar 3 
to the model of response level conflict resolution (Mansouri et al., 2009), it is probably too 4 
simplistic to argue that they share the common neural mechanisms. For example, our 5 
previous study (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013) showed that the pMFC region activated by 6 
cognitive imbalance, which is conceptually similar to cognitive dissonance (Abelson et al., 7 
1968; Gawronski and Strack, 2012), does not overlap with the region activated by response 8 
conflict. The region activated by response conflict was located more posteriorly (i.e., 9 
pre-SMA) (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013), consistent with two previous TMS studies (Mars et 10 
al., 2009; Soutschek et al., 2013) demonstrating that stimulating pre-SMA disrupts response 11 
conflict resolution. Although the lack of anatomical resolution in the present study does not 12 
allow us to specify the exact location stimulated by TMS, our pMFC target region roughly 13 
corresponds to x = 10, y = 48, z = 70 (Jurcak et al., 2005), which is more anterior than the 14 
previous studies: y = 18 (Mars et al., 2009) and y = 21 (Soutschek et al., 2013). As 15 
previously discussed (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013), we believe that the neural mechanism of 16 
a discrepancy resolution system may be similar to that of behavioral adjustment following 17 
an aversive outcome. Previously, we found that the areas activated by cognitive imbalance 18 
largely overlapped with the areas activated by aversive outcome (posterior dmPFC) (Izuma 19 
and Adolphs, 2013). This functional distinction within pMFC is consistent with what has 20 
been previously suggested (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Rushworth et al., 2004; Hikosaka and 21 
Isoda, 2010). Furthermore, other additional regions, such as the insula, seem to play a role 22 
in processing social types of conflict (Klucharev et al., 2009; van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma 23 
et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). Comparisons between these multiple systems for 24 
resolving discrepancies between expectations and outcomes should be investigated further 25 
in future research.  26 
It should be noted that the preference change observed in the present study could be 27 
explained by self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). Self-perception theory posits that just like 28 
we came to know another person’s preference by observing their behavior, we infer our 29 
 27 
own preference by observing our own behavior (e.g., I must like it because I chose it). This 1 
limitation is inherent in all past studies demonstrating choice-induced preference change, 2 
and Greenwald even argued that these two theories cannot be distinguished (Greenwald, 3 
1975, 2012). Although not conclusive, our present TMS study along with the previous 4 
fMRI study (Izuma et al., 2010) seem to support cognitive dissonance theory. In our 5 
previous fMRI study, the degree of cognitive dissonance is quantified as the discrepancy 6 
between a participant’s past choice and preference for the item, and we found that activity 7 
in the pMFC correlated with this parameter. Since this parameter is irrelevant to 8 
self-perception theory, being able to reduce choice-induced preference change by 9 
stimulating the pMFC with TMS suggests that dissonance reduction processes played a 10 
major role in the present study. But, we admit that the fact that our data is consistent with 11 
one theory does not necessarily mean that the other theory plays no role (i.e., consistency 12 
fallacy). Nonetheless, the present study highlights the potential of cognitive neuroscience 13 
methods (fMRI, TMS) in distinguishing two social psychological theories. For example, we 14 
can test whether different brain regions are activated by psychological processes assumed 15 
in cognitive dissonance theory vs. self-perception theory. If activated regions are reliably 16 
different, we can further test whether TMS to those regions could reduce choice-induced 17 
preference change. 18 
In summary, the present study demonstrated that TMS to the pMFC could reduce 19 
choice-induced preference change. Our results inform neural models of the choice 20 
justification processes implemented by the pMFC and provide a clear demonstration of the 21 
causal role of the pMFC. It will be most important in future studies to sharpen our 22 
understanding of this causal role by providing direct comparisons among different types of 23 
conflict, and to link the role of the pMFC to that of other brain regions with which it is 24 
connected. 25 
26 
 28 
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